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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Nicklaus Williams contends the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a
psychological evaluation pursuant at his request at the time he pled guilty. He also asserts it
imposed an excessive sentence because it did not sufficiently consider all the mitigating
information in his case.
sentencing hearing.

For either reason, this Court should remand this case for a new

Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Williams' sentence as it deems

appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Williams entered a guilty plea at the initial entry-ofplea hearing. (See R., pp.33-34, 42.) Specifically, he agreed to plead to possessing a stolen gun,
felon in possession of a firearm, and misdemeanor resisting arrest, and the State agreed to
dismiss other charges. (R., p.42.) In addition, the State agreed to recommend an aggregate
sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, be imposed and executed.

(R., p.42.)

Mr. Williams also agreed to pay restitution on all the charges, including those to be dismissed.
(R., pp.42-43.)

At the entry-of-plea hearing, Mr. Williams requested that the district court order a mental
health evaluation. (Tr., p.10, Ls.21-23.) That reiterated a request he had made in the guilty plea
advisory form, where he also reported he had been "committed to intermountain and believe I
need mental health. [sic]" (R., pp.37-38; see Tr., p.6, Ls.4-8 (the district court indicating it had a
copy of the completed advisory form at the entry-of-plea hearing).) The district court asked
Mr. Williams if he was currently receiving treatment, and he explained he had asked jail staff for
treatment but he had not begun receiving medications at that time. (Tr., p.11, Ls.7-15.) The

1

district court then asked if Mr. Williams was "currently expenencmg problems," and he
answered: "I don't know. I guess that would be up to a professional to determine." (Tr., p.11,
Ls.16-20.) He also explained that he has a family history of mental illness "[a]nd I find myself
in a position where I think it would be beneficial to figure that out." (Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12,
Ls.1-3.)

Defense counsel left it to the district court to decide whether to order a full

psychological evaluation or to rely on the mental health screening tool. (Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11,
L.1.)
The district court did not order a full evaluation because, "for sure when I see this, I will
defmitely ask for a mental health evaluation as part of the presentence process. I'm just not
convinced at this point because I don't have enough information what more we might need so
that will depend on some things that develop later." (Tr., p.12, Ls.4-10.) Ultimately, only the
mental health screening tool was used in this case.

(See presentence investigation report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.42-44; see generally R., Tr., PSI.) 1
The PSI prepared in this case contained an older PSI, prepared in 2008, which noted that
Mr. Williams had received some mental health counselling when he was younger. (PSI, p.159.)
Mr. Williams' grandmother, who had been Mr. Williams' primary caretaker after his mother
committed suicide when he was eleven years old, as he would be abused by his father whenever
he would live with his father, confirmed that Mr. Williams had received that counselling during
his youth, but noted it had not been effective. (PSI, p.48.)
A domestic battery evaluation conducted as part of the 2008 PSI reported that, at that
time, Mr. Williams was being given trazodone and Wellbutrin to treat depression. (PSI, pp.159,
237; compare PSI, p.203 (a PSI prepared in 2005 stating that Mr. Williams had not reported any

1

Citations to "PSI" refer to the electronic file "Williams 46610 psi.pd£"
2

mental health concerns at that earlier time).) An addendum to the 2008 PSI, prepared after
Mr. Williams completed a rider program in 2009, noted that part of his release plan included
contacting Business Psychology Associates to see if he were eligible to receive funding for
continuing treatment.

(PSI, p.24 7.)

He was also to contact Grace Counseling to continue

treatment for his substance abuse disorders.

(PSI, p.24 7.)

Another PSI, prepared after he

violated his probation in 2012, reported there had been no significant changes in his mental
condition. (PSI, pp.259, 265.)
When Mr. Williams was arrested in this case, the jail intake forms noted that he was
"manifest[ing] signs or symptoms of a psychiatric disorder or is developmentally disabled."
(PSI, p.69.) They also noted that he had attempted suicide on at least two occasions. (PSI,
pp.66, 69 (noting attempts in 2016 and 2017); see also PSI, p.20 (the new PSI prepared for this
case noting Mr. Williams history of suicide attempts).) As such, he was placed on the "SW list"
so that his mental condition could be properly evaluated. (PSI, pp.66, 69.)
The jail physician's notes reiterated that Mr. Williams "has a strong hx [history] of
depression."

(PSI, p.77.)

Initially, Mr. Williams was prescribed Risperdal, and then was

switched to Abilify. (PSI, pp.85-87.) The new PSI prepared for the current case reported that
the jail staff had subsequently prescribed Mr. Williams Zoloft and Risperdal. (PSI, p.20. )2 Trial
counsel noted that Mr. Williams was working with the jail staff to find a stable and effective
medication regimen. (Tr., p.31 Ls.10-18.)
In addition, the mental health screening tool and the associated GAIN-I evaluation
diagnosed Mr. Williams as suffering from several substance use disorders and gave "rule-out"

2

The provided records do not indicate when the jail staff ended the Abilify regimen and started
the Risperdal/Zoloft regimen. (See generally PSI.)

3

diagnoses for an Unspecified Anxiety Disorder; for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
Acute Stress Disorder, or other extreme stress disorder; and for Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD). (PSI, pp.29, 42.) The evaluators explained the term "rule-out" signified a
provisional diagnosis that contained "a strong presumption that the full criteria will be met for
the disorder." (PSI, pp.29, 42.) They explained they could not give a formal diagnosis for those
disorders because they were not licensed to do so. (PSI, pp.29, 42.) Nevertheless, the mental
health screener concluded Mr. Williams had a "SMI [severe mental illness] or MH [mental
health] needs" which should be treated with psychiatric medication, evaluation, management,
and education, along with the treatment recommended by the GAIN evaluation. (PSI, p.44.)
The GAIN evaluator recommended Mr. Williams be placed in a level 3 residential treatment
program to address his substance abuse issues. (PSI, p.40.)
The new PSI also noted that Mr. Williams expressed remorse for his actions leading to
and during his arrest in this case, which included absconding from parole supervision in another
case.

(PSI, p.5.)

In fact, he admitted to all the charged conduct, including the conduct

underlying the charges that were to be dismissed. (PSI, p.5.) He also explained that his actions
at the time of his arrest, such as his resisting arrest, were affected by his use of marijuana and
methamphetamine earlier that day. (PSI, p.5.)
At the sentencing hearing, neither Mr. Williams nor his attorney renewed the request for
a full mental health evaluation. 3 (See generally Tr.) However, trial counsel argued this was the
first time Mr. Williams had really acknowledged his mental health issues, and that recognition

3

Mr. Williams reserves the right to raise an issue about trial counsel's ineffectiveness in regard
to not renewing the request for a psychological evaluation based on the information in the new
PSI in an ensuing petition for post-conviction relief, should he determine that it is necessary and
appropriate to do so.

4

would be key to his efforts at rehabilitation gomg forward.

(Tr., p.30, L.9 - p.31, L.6.)

Mr. Williams expressly took responsibility for all the charged conduct in this case. (Tr., p.32,
Ls.11-18; compare PSI, p.24 (the new PSI author reporting that Mr. Williams had not taken
responsibility for his actions).) Trial counsel ultimately recommended the district court impose
an aggregate sentence with only one and one-half years fixed, as that would give Mr. Williams
an opportunity to get into the prison's treatment programs sooner. (Tr., p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.)
The district court stated that "you got a short -- relatively short-term sanction" for
absconding parole. (Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.1.) It appeared to partly blame the supervision
process in that respect, as "it seems to me things were probably left to drift too long," though it
pointed out that did not excuse Mr. Williams' poor choices while on release.

(Tr., p.35,

L.1 - p.36, L.10.) It acknowledged that his methamphetamine use appeared to be an attempt to
self-medicate his mental health issues. (See Tr., p.35, Ls.20-24 ("It's no way to deal with the
mental health issues.").) However, it ultimately imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed because "a substantial period of time clean and away is warranted. " 4
(Tr., p.36, Ls.12-13.) It specifically recommended that Mr. Williams receive substance abuse
and mental health treatment during that period of incarceration. (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-18.)
Mr. Williams filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.46, 50.)

4

Specifically, the district court imposed a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed, for
the theft-by-possession charge, a concurrent sentence of five years, with three years fixed, for the
felon-in-possession charge, and a concurrent sentence of six months for the resisting arrest
charge. (R., p.47; Tr., p.37, Ls.11-17.)
5

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a psychological evaluation
at Mr. Williams' request.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Williams without sufficiently considering all the mitigating information.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Ordering A Psychological Evaluation Pursuant
At Mr. Williams' Request
A.

Standard Of Review
The decision of whether to order a psychological evaluation is a committed to the district

court's discretion. State v. Black (Black I), 161 Idaho 867, 870 (Ct. App. 2017). A district court
abuses its discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; it acts beyond the
outer bounds of its discretion; it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or it
reaches its decision without exercising reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,

863-64 (2018). Here, as in Black I, the information before the district court showed a reason to
believe that Mr. Williams' mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing, and so,
the district court acted inconsistent with the applicable legal standards by not ordering a
psychological evaluation in light of that information.

B.

The Record Shows There Was Reason To Believe Mr. Williams' Mental Health Would
Be A Significant Issue At Sentencing, And Therefore, A Psychological Evaluation Was
Statutorily-Required
The relevant statute provides: "If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the

defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall"
order a psychological examination of the defendant by a licensed professional. LC. § 19-2522(1)
(emphasis added).

In other words, the district court may only refuse to order such an

examination if there was no reason to believe the defendant's mental health would be a
significant factor at sentencing or if the information about his mental condition was already
provided to the district court in other sources. State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 506 (Ct. App.

7

2000). When evaluating whether there was reason to believe the defendant's mental condition
would be a significant factor at sentencing, "we focus our inquiry on whether the record supports
[such a] finding." Black I, 161 Idaho at 870; accord State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 319 (2012)
(finding the district court erred by not ordering a psychological evaluation because its
determination that the defendant's mental condition would not be a significant factor at
sentencing "is not supported by the record").
The record shows that, at the entry-of-plea hearing, Mr. Williams specifically requested
that the district court order a mental health evaluation.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.21-23; R., p.38.) He

reported that he had been "committed to intermountain and believe I need mental health. [sic]"
(R., p.37.)

Intermountain Hospital is a mental health treatment facility located in Boise.

Intermountain Hospital, "About Us," https://intermountainhospital.com/about-us/ (last accessed
7/3/19).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held the fact that the defendant had previously been
hospitalized for mental health reasons, among other factors, created a reason to believe his
mental condition would be a significant issue at sentencing, and thus, the district court erred by
not ordering a psychological evaluation. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 321. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals has held the fact that the defendant had previously received intermittent treatment for
mental health issues, had been self-medicating with illegal drugs, and had a history of suicide
attempts was "sufficient to alert the district court that [his] mental condition would be an
important consideration at sentencing." State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 153 (Ct. App. 2002);

compare State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding a defendant's mere report
that she had "dealt with mental health issues throughout her life" was not enough to show a
reason to believe her mental condition would be significant issue at sentencing, particularly when
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the other information before the district court showed "[n Jo evidence of gross psychopathology"
or other symptoms of a serious mental illness, but instead "emphasized that [her] troubles came
from drug use"). Thus, Mr. Williams' report that he had previously been hospitalized for mental
health reasons created a reason to believe his mental health would be a significant issue at
sentencing.
Moreover, when the district court asked Mr. Williams if he was expenencmg any
"problems" in regard to his mental health, he answered, "I fmd myself in a position where I think
it would be beneficial to figure that out." (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-3.) From the context, his statement
meant he was in a "position" where he felt something was wrong with his mental condition and
he feared it was a mental illness because he knew he was at risk for such conditions due to his
family history and because he had actually been hospitalized for such conditions before. (See
R., p.37; Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.12, L.3.) That understanding of his answer is reinforced by the fact
that he was specifically asking for a mental health evaluation and treatment from entities in a
position to order it (the district court and the jail staff) to help him address the "position" he was
in. (See Tr., p.10, Ls.21-23, p.11, Ls.7-15.) As such, the specific information in the record
showed a reason to believe his mental condition would be an important factor at sentencing,
which is all LC. § 19-2522, by its plain language, requires.
This is not a case like Schultz, as there was no evidence in the record at the entry-of-plea
hearing which contradicted the reason to believe that Mr. Williams was suffering from a serious
mental illness or mental health issue. (See generally R., Tr.) Likewise, the fact that trial counsel
left it to the district court to determine whether to use the mental health screening tool or order a
full evaluation is ofno importance. (See Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.1.) That statement still makes
it clear that Mr. Williams wanted the district court to consider ordering a full psychological

9

evaluation and, once he presented information showing a reason to believe his mental health
would be a significant factor, the applicable legal standards are clear - the district court was
statutorily-bound to order a full psychological evaluation rather than rely on the screening tool.

See I.C. § 19-2522(1); Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 319; Black I, 161 Idaho at 870; Coonts, 137
Idaho at 153.
Thus, as in Hanson, Coonts, and Black I, the district court's decision to not order a full
psychological evaluation was contrary to the applicable legal standards, and thus, an abuse of its
discretion.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Williams
Without Sufficiently Considering All The Mitigating Information

A.

Standard Of Review
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, 103

Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). As discussed in Section I(A) supra, the district court can abuse
its discretion by not exercising reason or by not acting consistent with the applicable legal
standards in reaching its decision. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863-64.

B.

A Sufficient Consideration Of The Mitigating Factors Reveals A More Lenient Sentence
Would Better Serve All The Goals Of Sentencing In This Case
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh

sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest.

See Reinke, 103 Idaho at 772.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing

10

criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293,294 (1997). The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society;
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility ofrehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district
court should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971),
superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v.
Bickhart, 164 Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (though noting the preference identified in McCoy

does not preclude a sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the
goals of sentencing). Additionally, while the district court may place significant weight on one
of the goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of
the other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases); compare State v. Black (Black II), 2018 WL
4940310, *5 (Ct. App. 2018) (remanding that case a second time because, in focusing on the goal
of protecting society while re-imposing the sentence in that case, the district court improperly
refused to consider the defendant's mental condition as a significant factor in mitigation). 5

5

Mr. Williams recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does
not cite to Black II as authority requiring a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely
references it as a historical example of how a learned court has analyzed a similar situation.
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
11

As an initial matter, to the extent the district court imposed a longer sentence in this case
to compensate for what was, in its opinion, an improperly-light punishment for absconding
parole (see Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.4), the district court abused its discretion. See State v.
Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228 (Ct. App. 1999). In Findeisen, the defendant violated his probation, in
part, by committing a new crime. Id. One district court judge imposed a sanction for the
probation violation, while another imposed a sentence for the new offense. Id. The judge
imposing the sentence for the new offense (who is the same judge who sentenced Mr. Williams
in this case) felt the sanction that had been imposed for the probation violation was too light and
decided to impose a longer new sentence to compensate for that perceived inadequacy. Id. The
Court of Appeals held that was an abuse of discretion. Id. It explained that, while the district
court can consider a defendant’s prior misconduct when it imposes a sentence, it cannot usurp
another judge’s discretion to determine the proper sanction for that other misconduct. Id. Here,
the district court stated it felt that the sanction for the parole violation was a “relatively short
term.” (Tr., p.34, 23 - p.35, L.1.) Thus, to the extent it imposed a longer sentence for this
offense to compensate for a perceived inadequacy in the sanction ordered by the parole board,
the district court abused its discretion.
That concern is particularly prominent in this case, where a sufficient consideration of the
conduct actually at issue in this case, in light of the mitigating factors which are present, reveals
that a more lenient sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing. For example, the
district court needs to sufficiently consider is the defendant’s mental condition because of the
effect it has on his culpability. See, e.g., State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 885 (2011) (“As a
general matter, defendants with diminished mental capacity are less blameworthy than people
who are cognitively intact.”); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 439 (1991) (“It is clear that a mental

12

defect may diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act."); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999) (noting that, when it is an issue, the district court is obligated to consider the
impact of a defendant's mental condition on his culpability for the offense under LC. § 19-2523).
Essentially, when the defendant is less culpable, the justification for a longer sentence through
the goals of retribution and deterrence is reduced. See id.
The record reveals that Mr. Williams' mental health issues likely played a role in his
actions in this case, and thus, demonstrate he had a reduced culpability. For example, the jail
intake notes indicate that Mr. Williams "manifest[ing] signs or symptoms of a psychiatric
disorder or is developmentally disabled," when he was arrested.

(PSI, p.69.)

The ensuing

evaluation of his condition revealed that his situation was serious enough to require psychiatric
medication.

(PSI, p.20 (reporting the jail staff had ultimately prescribed him Zoloft and

Risperdal) 6 ; see PSI, pp.85-87 (noting other, single-drug regimens tried by the jail staff).) The
conclusion that Mr. Williams' mental health issues had an impact on his culpability is reinforced
by that fact that he was, as the district court indicated (Tr., p.35, Ls.20-24; see PSI, p.5), trying to
self-medicate his symptoms with methamphetamine. See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981) (explaining that the ingestion of drugs and alcohol should be considered as a
mitigating factor at sentencing because, while it is not a defense to the charge, it does have an
impact on the defendant's culpability).

6

Zoloft is prescribed to treat, among other things, PTSD and some anxiety disorders. Mayo
Clinic, "Drugs and Supplements: Sertraline (Oral Route)," https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/sertraline-oral-route/description/ drg-20065940 (last updated 5/1/19) (noting that
Zoloft is a brand name for sertraline in the United States). Risperdal is prescribed to treat,
among other things, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or irritability associated with autism. Mayo
Clinic, "Drugs and Supplements: Risperidone (Oral Route)," https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/risperidone-oral-route/description/drg-20067189 (last updated 5/1/19) (noting that
"Risperdal M-Tab" is one of the brand names for risperidone in the United States).
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Mr. Williams’ current, provisional diagnoses for PTSD and/or other anxiety disorders
also reinforce that conclusion, as those provisional diagnoses represent an evolution in, or a more
accurate understanding of, Mr. Williams’ mental health issues. (See PSI, pp.29, 42.) He was
initially diagnosed and treated for depression at least from 2008 through 2012. (PSI, pp.77, 159,
237, 259, 265; compare PSI, p.203 (a PSI prepared in 2005 stating that Mr. Williams reported no
mental health problems at that time); with PSI, p.48 (Mr. Williams’ grandmother verifying that
Mr. Williams had received some mental health treatment during his youth, but it was not the kind
of treatment he needed).) With a more accurate understanding of Mr. Williams’ mental health
conditions, their impact on his actions can be better assessed.
More importantly, a more accurate prognosis for rehabilitation given because he can now
receive more targeted treatment for his conditions. To that point, trial counsel explained that a
sentence with a shorter fixed term would give Mr. Williams the opportunity to get into
appropriate treatment programs available in prison sooner. (Tr., p.30, L.9 - p.32, L.3.) Both the
Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that the timing of
rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Owen,
73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228
(1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App.
2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, when all these facts about
Mr. Williams’ mental health issues are sufficiently considered, they reveal a more lenient
sentence was appropriate.
The district court did not, however, sufficiently consider those aspects of Mr. Williams’
mental condition. Despite recommending mental health and substance abuse treatment during
his incarceration, the district court determined a longer fixed sentence was needed to give him “a

14

substantial period of time clean and away.” (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-13.) That actually indicates it was
considering Mr. Williams’ mental health issues to be a product of his methamphetamine use,
rather than a separate condition. That is improper, as the record demonstrates that, though his
mental health and substance abuse issues were co-occurring, they are two distinct issues, and so,
needed to be treated separately.

(See PSI, p.40 (the GAIN evaluation recommending that

Mr. Williams “[f]ollow all recommendations from the mental health screening” in addition to the
treatment it recommended for his substance abuse issues); PSI, p.44 (the mental health screening
similarly recommending medications to treat the mental health issues alongside the treatment
recommendations in the GAIN evaluation).) Since the district court did not sufficiently consider
the impact of Mr. Williams’ mental health issues on his culpability or his potential for
rehabilitation, it abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Other mitigating factors in the record reinforce the conclusion that a more lenient
sentence would better serve the goals of sentencing in this case. For example, even though his
culpability was reduced, Mr. Williams still expressed remorse and took accountability for all the
charged offenses in this case, including those actions for which charges had been dismissed
under the plea agreement. (See Tr., p.32, Ls.11-18.) In fact, he agreed to pay appropriate
restitution for any losses caused by any of that conduct.

(R., pp.42-43.)

Acceptance of

responsibly and expression of remorse are important first steps toward rehabilitation, and so, a
more lenient sentence, one which would foster his continued rehabilitation, was appropriate. See
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a willingness to pay restitution, in particular, should be considered
in mitigation in this regard). Since a sufficient consideration of all these mitigating factors
reveals a more lenient sentence, such as the one recommended by trial counsel, would better
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promote all the goals of sentencing, the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence on Mr. Williams.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this case
for new sentencing after such a psychological evaluation is conducted. Alternatively, he requests
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2019.
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